

Internet of Things Security

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December 12, 2018

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- 2 7 IoT security failures
- 3 7 IoT security challenges
- 4 6 IoT good security practices

7 IoT security failures

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1. Dyn cyberattack



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- October 21, 2016

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7 IoT security failures

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- DDoS attack on systems operated by DNS provider Dyn
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- Anonymous and New World Hackers (?), "an angry gamer" (*Forbes*), "script kiddies" (*FlashPoint*)

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack



Figure: Various devices targeted by Mirai malware

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack




Figure: Map of areas most affected by attack

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Services affected by the attack:

AirBnb	GitHub	Quora	Tumblr
Amazon.com	Grubhub	Reddit	Twilio
Ancestry.com	HBO	Roblox	Twitter
The A.V. Club	Heroku	Ruby Lane	Verizon Communications
BBC	HostGator	RuneScape	Visa
The Boston Globe	iHeartRadio	SaneBox	Vox Media
Box	Imgur	Seamless	Walgreens
Business Insider	Indiegogo	Second Life	The Wall Street Journal
CNN	Mashable	Shopify	Wikia
Comcast	National Hockey League	Slack	Wired
CrunchBase	Netflix	SoundCloud	Wix.com
DirecTV	The New York Times	Squarespace	WWE Network
The Elder Scrolls Online	Overstock.com	Spotify	Xbox Live
Electronic Arts	PayPal	Starbucks	Yammer
Etsy	Pinterest	Storify	Yelp
FiveThirtyEight	Pixlr	Swedish Civil	Zillow
Fox News	PlayStation Network	Contingencies Agency	
The Guardian	Qualtrics	Swedish Government	

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – modus operandi

- 1 Locate and compromise IoT devices to further grow the botnet.

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1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – modus operandi

- 1 Locate and compromise IoT devices to further grow the botnet.
- 2 Launch DDoS attacks based on instructions received from a remote C&C.

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1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – default passwords list:

root xc3511	admin (none)	admin1 password	root user
root vizxv	root pass	administrator 1234	root realtek
root admin	admin admin1234	666666 666666	root 00000000
admin admin	root 1111	888888 888888	admin 1111111
root 888888	admin smcadmin	ubnt ubnt	admin 1234
root xmhdipc	admin 1111	root klv1234	admin 12345
root default	root 666666	root Zte521	admin 54321
root juantech	root password	root hi3518	admin 123456
root 123456	root 1234	root jvbzd	admin 7ujMko0admin
root 54321	root klv123	root anko	admin 1234
support support	Administrator admin	root zlxx.	admin pass
root (none)	service service	root 7ujMko0vizxv	admin meinsm
admin password	supervisor supervisor	root 7ujMko0admin	tech tech
root root	guest guest	root system	mother f**er
root 12345	guest 12345	root ikwb	
user user	guest 12345	root dreambox	

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – user-agents:

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.116 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/51.0.2704.103 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/52.0.2743.116 Safari/537.36

Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_11_6) AppleWebKit/601.7.7
(KHTML, like Gecko) Version/9.1.2 Safari/601.7.7

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – "Don't Mess With" List:

127.0.0.0/8 - Loopback

0.0.0.0/8 - Invalid address space

3.0.0.0/8 - General Electric (GE)

15.0.0.0/7 - Hewlett-Packard (HP)

56.0.0.0/8 - US Postal Service

10.0.0.0/8 - Internal network

192.168.0.0/16 - Internal network

172.16.0.0/14 - Internal network

100.64.0.0/10 - IANA NAT reserved

169.254.0.0/16 - IANA NAT reserved

198.18.0.0/15 - IANA Special use

224.*.*.*+ - Multicast

6.0.0.0/7 - Department of Defense

11.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

21.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

22.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

26.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

28.0.0.0/7 - Department of Defense

30.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

33.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

55.0.0.0/8 - Department of Defense

214.0.0.0/7 - Department of Defense

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – a territorial predator

The following scripts close all processes that use SSH, Telnet and HTTP ports:

```
killer_kill_by_port(htons(23)) // Kill telnet service  
killer_kill_by_port(htons(22)) // Kill SSH service  
killer_kill_by_port(htons(80)) // Kill HTTP service
```

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – a territorial predator

```
table_unlock_val(TABLE_KILLER_ANIME);  
// If path contains ".anime" kill.  
if (util_stristr(realpath, rp_len - 1, table_retrieve_val(TABLE_KILLER_ANIME, NULL)) != -1)  
{  
    unlink(realpath);  
    kill(pid, 9);  
}  
table_lock_val(TABLE_KILLER_ANIME);
```

Goals:

- 1 Help Mirai maximize the attack potential of the botnet devices.
- 2 Prevent similar removal attempts from other malware.

7 IoT security failures

1. Dyn cyberattack

Mirai – trace amounts of Cyrillic

```
// Get username
this.conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(60 * time.Second))
this.conn.Write([]byte("\033[34;1mпользователь\033[33;3m: \033[0m"))
username, err := this.ReadLine(false)
if err != nil {
    return
}

// Get password
this.conn.SetDeadline(time.Now().Add(60 * time.Second))
this.conn.Write([]byte("\033[34;1mпароль\033[33;3m: \033[0m"))
password, err := this.ReadLine(true)
if err != nil {
    return
}
```

7 IoT security failures

2. Chrysler's UConnect hack



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- the hackers targeted the Uconnect board computer using WiFi
- the results were announced at the Black Hat USA 2015 security conference


7 IoT security failures

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- the hackers targeted the Uconnect board computer using WiFi
- the results were announced at the Black Hat USA 2015 security conference
- after issuing a patch Chrysler announced a recall for 1.4 million vehicles

7 IoT security failures

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7 IoT security failures

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Breaking into WiFi:

- the Wi-Fi password is generated automatically, based on the time when the car and its multimedia system — the head unit — is turned on for the very first time.

7 IoT security failures

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- moreover it turned out that Chrysler's cars Wi-Fi password is generated before the actual time and date is set and is based on default system time plus a few seconds during which the head unit boots up.

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- moreover it turned out that Chrysler's cars is generated before the actual time and date is set and is based on default system time plus a few seconds during which the head unit boots up.
- hackers were left with a few dozens passwords to check

7 IoT security failures

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Taking control over the car:

- ECU sends messages at regular interval

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- if the hacker injects a fake message, the ECU temporarily disables non-critical systems (multimedia, speedometers, locks, etc.)

7 IoT security failures

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Taking control over the car:

- ECU sends messages at regular interval
- if the hacker injects a fake message, the ECU temporarily disables non-critical systems (multimedia, speedometers, locks, etc.)
- the hackers also hacked into Parking Assist Module

7 IoT security failures

3. Washington DC CCTV system hack



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3. Washington DC CCTV system hack

- 9-12 January 2017
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- 123 of the 187 cameras used by the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia
- the internet-connected computers behind the cameras were sending "ransomware-laden spam emails"
- the attack was halted on 12 January after the MPDC's IT network administrator discovered that multiple cameras had been disabled.

7 IoT security failures

4. Samsung smart TVs



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- 2015

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- It turned out that some Samsung smart TVs are sending users' voice searches and data over the internet unencrypted, allowing hackers and snoopers to listen in on their activity. It had been believed that the information was encrypted.


7 IoT security failures

4. Samsung smart TVs

- 2015
- It turned out that some Samsung smart TVs are sending users' voice searches and data over the internet unencrypted, allowing hackers and snoopers to listen in on their activity. It had been believed that the information was encrypted.
- In some Samsung models, neither the audio, nor the text returned was encrypted.

7 IoT security failures

4. Samsung smart TVs



The screenshot displays a network packet capture (likely Wireshark) showing a text-based communication. The text is unencrypted and contains sensitive information related to a voice recognition attempt. Key details include:

- Metadata: `9...G...9...k.$y...y...$.#2...$...`
- Session ID: `NMAS_PRFX_SESSION_ID.$37301305-b866-44e6-a994-7b8e9b412b91`
- Command and Status: `result_type..NMDP_ASR_CMD..status_code....NMAS_PRFX_TRANSACTION_I`
- Confidence: `0..6..confidences.`
- Words and Confidence: `words....4.2..word..Samsung*no-space-before. confidence..0.96.2.0..word..Samson*no-space-before. confidence..0.0.3.1..word..Samsung*no-space-before.`
- Recognition Result: `confidence..0.0..cadence_regulatable_result..completeRecognition..audio_transfer_inf`
- Time and Bytes: `0....packages.L.$..time..20150213020706286..bytes...>$.time..20150213020707044..bytes....`
- Server and Audio ID: `nss_server..172.16.36.143:4500..end_time..20150213020707043..audio_id....`
- Response and Transcriptions: `start_time..20150213020704626..final_response....transcriptions...Samsung..Samson..Sa`
- Prompt: `msong..prompt...`
- Result Format: `result_format..rec_text_results.....`

At the bottom, a status bar indicates: `Entire conversation (56543 bytes)`

Figure: Text send without encryption as a result of voice recognition of the word "Samsung"

7 IoT security failures

4. Samsung smart TVs

"Samsung takes consumer privacy very seriously and our products are designed with privacy in mind. Our latest Smart TV models are equipped with data encryption and a software update will soon be available for download on other models."

Samsung spokesman

7 IoT security failures

5. My Friend Cayla - The Internet of Toys



7 IoT security failures

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- 2016/2017

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- it was revealed that the communications between the Cayla doll and the parent's app were not sufficiently protected

7 IoT security failures

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- the doll is equipped with a microphone, bluetooth connection, and Internet access
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- child recordings were sold to third-parties for targeted advertising

7 IoT security failures

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- 2016/2017
- the doll "My friend Cayla" claimed to be the first world interactive doll
- the doll is equipped with a microphone, bluetooth connection, and Internet access
- it was revealed that the communications between the Cayla doll and the parent's app were not sufficiently protected
- child recordings were sold to third-parties for targeted advertising
- the doll was banned in Germany and the parents were told to destroy the dolls


7 IoT security failures

5. My Friend Cayla - The Internet of Toys



7 IoT security failures

6. Connected cardiac devices



7 IoT security failures

6. Connected cardiac devices & insulin pumps

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7 IoT security failures

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- 2012
- FDA (Food and Drug Administration) confirmed that St. Jude cardiac devices have vulnerabilities that could allow a hacker to access a device
- a hacker could potentially deplete the battery or administer incorrect pacing

7 IoT security failures

- 2011

7 IoT security failures

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7 IoT security failures

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- In July 2013 Jack died a week before he was to give a presentation on hacking heart implants. According to the coroner's report, Jack died of an overdose of drugs.

7 IoT security failures

7. Hackable Sniper Rifles



7 IoT security failures

7. Hackable Sniper Rifles



7 IoT security challenges

7 IoT security challenges

1. Insufficient testing and updating

Companies are too careless when it comes to handling of device-related security risks. Most of these devices and IoT products don't get enough updates while, some don't get updates at all. Early computer systems had this same problem, which was somewhat solved with automatic updates. IoT manufacturers, however, are more eager to produce and deliver their devices as fast as they can, without giving security too much of a thought.

7 IoT security challenges

2. Brute-forcing and the issue of default passwords

Example: Mirai.

7 IoT security challenges

3. IoT malware and ransomware

Traditional ransomware used to encrypt or lock user's data and ask for a ransom.
In IoT: a hybrid of both malware and ransomware.
Example: IP cameras.

7 IoT security challenges

4. IoT botnets aiming at cryptocurrency

The open-source cryptocurrency Monero is one of the many digital currencies currently being mined with IoT devices.

7 IoT security challenges

5. Data security and privacy concerns (mobile, web, cloud)

Example: Samsung smart TVs issue.

7 IoT security challenges

6. Small IoT attacks that evade detection

Instead of using the big guns, hackers will most likely be using subtle attack small enough to let the information leak out instead of just grabbing millions and millions of records at once.

7 IoT security challenges

7. AI and automation

Using autonomous systems to make autonomous decisions that affect millions of functions across large infrastructures such as healthcare, power and transportation might be too risky, especially once you consider that it only takes a single error in the code or a misbehaving algorithm to bring down the entire infrastructure.

6 IoT good security practices

6 IoT good security practices

1. Authentication

Never create a product with a default password which is the same across all devices. Each device should have a complex random password assigned to it during manufacturing.

6 IoT good security practices

2. Debug

Never leave any kind of debugging access on a production device. Even if you are tempted to leave access on a non-standard port using a hard-coded random password, in the end it will be discovered. Don't do it.

6 IoT good security practices

3. Encryption

All communications between an IoT device and the cloud need to be encrypted. Use SSL/TLS where appropriate.

6 IoT good security practices

4. Privacy

Ensure that no personal data (including things like WiFi passwords) is readily accessible should a hacker gain access to the device. Use encryption for storing data along with salts.

6 IoT good security practices

5. Web Interface

Any web interface should be protected against the standard hacker techniques like SQL injections and cross-site scripting.

6 IoT good security practices

6. Firmware updates

Bugs are a fact of life, often they are just a nuisance. However security bugs are bad, even dangerous. Therefore all IoT devices should support Over-The-Air (OTA) updates. However those updates need to be verified before applied.

The end

Thank you for listening!